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Financial market instability has been the focus of attention of both
academic and policy circles.  Rating agencies have been under particular
scrutiny lately as promoters of financial excesses, upgrading countries in
good times and downgrading them in bad times.  Using a panel of
emerging economies, this paper examines whether sovereign ratings affect
financial markets.  We find that changes in sovereign ratings have an
impact on country risk and stock returns.  We also find that these changes
are transmitted across countries, with neighbor-country effects being more
significant.  Rating upgrades (downgrades) tend to occur following market
rallies (downturns).  Countries with more vulnerable economies, as
measured by low ratings, are more sensitive to changes in U.S. interest
rates.
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Worldwide financial market instability has been the focus of attention of both
academic and policy circles.  Naturally, following the series of currency crashes in the
1990s, most of the discussion has centered on currency crises.  The latest crisis in Turkey
in February 2001 will certainly contribute to keeping an avid interest in the triggers of
crises well into the new millennium.  But currency collapses are not the only ones to have
attracted attention.  The daily volatility of stock and bond markets in non-crisis times
have also stirred interest, with, for example, the vagaries of the NASDAQ index in the
United States making the daily headlines of newspapers around the globe.
Many have argued that globalization is at the heart of this volatility, with highly
diversified investors not paying much attention to economic fundamentals and following
the herd in the presence of asymmetric information.  (See, for example, Calvo and
Mendoza (2000)).  Naturally, this argument has provided ammunition to those supporting
the re-introduction of capital controls, as argued in Krugman (1998) and Stiglitz (2000).
Policies that can lead to moral hazard, including bailouts by both international institutions
and governments, have also been suggested as other culprits of financial volatility and
financial excesses.  (See, for example, McKinnon and Pill (1997) and Dooley (1998)).
The list of culprits does not stop here.  Rating agencies have also been under
scrutiny lately as promoters of financial excesses.  As discussed in Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz
(1999), their pro-cyclical behavior, upgrading countries in good times and downgrading
them in bad times, may have contributed to magnifying the boom-bust pattern in stock
markets. Even if rating agencies do not behave pro-cyclically, their announcements may
still trigger market jitters.  This is because most institutional investors can only hold2
investment grade instruments (i.e. securities with ratings above a certain threshold).
Thus, changes in ratings, downgrading (upgrading) sovereign debt below (above)
investment grade, may have a drastic impact on prices, because these rating changes
affect the pool of investors.
1  Rating changes may also unveil new (private) information
about a country and thus they may fuel rallies or downturns.  This effect is likely to be
stronger in emerging markets, where problems of asymmetric information and
transparency are more severe.  Finally, changes in ratings might act as a wake-up call,
with rating changes for one country affecting other countries with similar economies.
Research on the effects of changes in sovereign ratings has flourished in the
1990s.   This work has mostly focused on the effects of ratings on the instruments being
rated.  For example, Cantor and Packer (1996) and Reisen and Von Maltzan (1997) and
(1999) examine the effects of rating changes of sovereign debt and find a significant
effect on bond yield spreads.  Similarly, Hand,  Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) show
that rating announcements directly affect corporate securities.  Richards and Deddouche
(1999), using emerging market bank-level data, examine the impact of rating changes on
bank stock prices, but do not find statistically significant effects.
Previous research has not examined, however, whether rating changes for one
country trigger contagious fluctuations in asset markets in neighboring countries nor has
it examined whether ratings for one type of security affect other asset markets.  To our
knowledge, the only exception is  Kaminsky and  Schmukler (1999), who examine
spillover effects of rating changes, among different types of news, in neighboring
                                                            
1 These effects are not just confined to the pool of investors acquiring sovereign debt.  When a credit rating
agency downgrades sovereign debt of a country, all debt instruments from that country might have to be
downgraded accordingly because of the sovereign ceiling doctrine.  As a result, commercial banks in the
country that turn out to be rated as sub-investment grade can no longer issue internationally recognized3
countries and find that news regarding the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower
affects other countries’ stock and bond markets.
Cross-country contagion effects can be large, witness the spillover effects of the
Russian default on developed and developing countries.
2  Rating agencies may contribute
to these comovements in financial markets around the world.  Similarly, news for one
particular market can affect yields of other securities.  These effects can, in some
episodes, become quite dramatic, as was the case of the default of the State of  Minas
Gerais on the Brazilian real.  Again, rating agencies may contribute to heighten financial
instability.
Neither has previous research examined whether economic vulnerability may
trigger a large reaction of domestic financial markets to international events.  For
example, hikes in world interest rates may affect more drastically countries with
economies in distress (with banking  fragilities, liquidity problems due to high
concentration of short-term debt, or near insolvency) than countries with healthier
economies.
3  This “vulnerability” effect may, in fact, explain some conflicting results in
the empirical literature that examines international transmission of shocks. For example,
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) find that U.S. interest
rate shocks do not affect sovereign bond spreads, while Herrera and Perry (2000) find
that they do.  Interestingly, the Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and Kamin and von Kleist
(1999) studies include data only up to 1997 (before the crises) while the  Herrera and
                                                                                                                                                                                    
letters of credit for domestic exporters and importers, isolating the country from international capital
markets.  Similarly, corporations will not be able to issue debt in international capital markets.
2 The word contagion here is used in a broad sense to denote cross-country spillover effects, regardless of
the nature of the shock.  For alternative definitions and related papers see www.worldbank.org/contagion.
3 On a similar vein, Frankel, Schmukler, and Serven (2000) study the transmission of international interest
rates to countries with different exchange rate regimes.4
Perry (2000) sample includes observations on the crises in Asia, Russia, and Brazil, and
thus comprises episodes with very fragile economies.
This paper complements the previous research on rating agencies by also
examining these possible cross-country and security-market spillover-effects of rating
changes.  It also contributes to the literature on contagion and international transmission
of shocks by examining the effect of domestic vulnerability, as measured by the ratings
of international agencies, on the extent of international spillovers.  Our results can be
summarized as follows.
First, rating changes significantly affect bond and stock markets, with yield
spreads increasing on average 3 percent and stock returns declining about 1 percent
following a downgrade.
Second, rating changes also contribute to contagion or spillover effects, with
rating changes among emerging markets triggering changes in both yield spreads and
stock returns in foreign countries.  Still, the effect is smaller than that of rating changes of
the domestic economy.
Third, similar to the findings in the literature on contagion, the “contagion”
effects of rating changes are of a regional nature.
4
Fourth, fragile economies, as measured by the international ratings, are more
severely affected by changes in U.S. interest rates.  In fact, interest rates hikes in financial
centers fuel increases in sovereign risk 50 percent larger in vulnerable circumstances,
relative to the changes when countries have more healthy economies.
                                                            
4 See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000a).5
Lastly, domestic-country rating upgrades take place following market rallies,
while downgrades occur after market downturns.  Foreign changes in ratings have a
sustained effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the
methodology. Section 3 presents the data.  Section 4 discusses the results.  Section 5
concludes.
2. Methodology
To study the effects of ratings and vulnerability, we follow two different
methodologies.  First, we estimate panel regressions.  Second, we perform event studies.
The two methodologies are complementary in the sense that they show different aspects
of the data.
A. Panel Regressions
The panel estimations study the reaction of country risk and stock returns to
changes in ratings and U.S. interest rates.  The fact that we use daily data does not allow
us to control for country fundamentals, which are typically reported on a monthly or
quarterly basis.  But we do control for past changes of the explanatory variables.  We use
only one lag since further lags appear to be insignificant.
We estimate different specifications for both country risk and stock prices.  The
first specification is the following pooled panel:
t i
US
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DYi,t represents alternatively the log change in spreads and the log change in stock
market prices.  The sub-indexes i and t stand for country and time, respectively.  The
error term ei,t can be characterized by an independently distributed random variable with
mean zero and variance 
2
,t i s .  We estimate equation (1) using least squares, allowing for
heteroskedastic residuals.
DRt stands for the change in ratings.  The variable DRt is equal to 1 (-1) if there is
an upgrade (downgrade) at time t by any agency on any type of debt (foreign or domestic
currency) from any country in the sample.  The variable is equal to zero otherwise.  If
changes in ratings convey new information to market participants, we expect  0 ˆ < b  in
the regression for country risk; namely, rating upgrades (downgrades) lead to decreases
(increases) in country risk.  Analogously, in the regression for stock returns, we expect
0 ˆ > b .
US
t i D  stands for the change in U.S. interest rates; strictly speaking, the interest rate
is  ( )
US
t i + · 1 log 100 .  As argued in  Kamin and  von  Kleist (1999), there are different
channels through which changes in U.S. interest rates can affect country risk.  First, if
there is a positive probability that a government will not pay its debt, increases in U.S.
rates will prompt a higher rise in the interest rate of the government’s debt.  The higher
increase is to compensate the probability of no repayment.  Second, rises in U.S. interest
rates increase the burden of the debt, decreasing a country’s repayment capacity.  Third,
increases in U.S. rates can decrease investors’ “appetite for risk,” reducing the demand
for risky assets from emerging countries, thus increasing the country risk.  In sum, if
increases in U.S. rates lead to higher country risk, we expect  0 ˆ > g  in the equation for7
country risk.  A similar explanation can be argued for stock returns.  In fact, governments
can levy taxes on corporations if they face higher debt payments.  Therefore, we expect
that U.S. interest rates negatively affect stock returns, or that  0 ˆ < g  in the equation for
stock returns.
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The variable 
i
t i R , D  is equal to 1 (-1) if there is an upgrade (downgrade) at time t
by any agency on any type of debt (foreign or domestic currency) from country i.  The
variable is equal to zero otherwise.  The variable 
j
t i R , D  is similar to the latter but takes the
value 1 (-1) when there is an upgrade (downgrade) in country  j for j„i.  That is, this
specification tries to examine whether there is a “contagious” effect of credit ratings.
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The difference between this specification and the previous one is that we separate
the ratings into ratings for domestic-currency debt (dc) and ratings for foreign-currency
debt (fc), both for the domestic and foreign countries, i and j.  If ratings are important, we
expect the domestic country foreign-currency ratings (fc) to be significant in the equation
for country risk, because this is the instrument that credit ratings are evaluating.  In other
words, we expect a statistically significant  0 ˆ , >
fc i b .  A-priori, the estimated coefficient
for domestic-currency debt, 
dc i, ˆ b , is not expected to affect the country risk, after
controlling for changes in foreign-currency ratings.  Still, the coefficient for domestic-8
currency debt captures an exchange rate risk and may provide further insights into the
vulnerability of the economy.
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, D  is equal to 1 (-1) if there is an upgrade (downgrade) at time t
by any agency on domestic-currency debt from country r (for r„i).  r represents a country
that belongs to the same geographic region (East Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin




, D  is similar to
the latter but takes the value 1 (-1) for countries outside the geographic region.  The
variables with the superscript fc denote upgrades and downgrades on foreign-currency
debt.  In this specification we examine whether the “contagious” effect of credit ratings is
similar within a region or across regions.
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This specification is similar to the previous one, but we allow for the vulnerability
effect.  That is, we use different coefficients, 
R g , for the sensitivity to changes in U.S.
rates.  In particular, we divide the observations into two different groups, observations
with low and high ratings.  We expect that countries with high ratings should be less
affected by changes in U.S. rates due to the three channels described above.  (A similar
argument can be made for stock returns.)  First, given that higher ratings mean a lower
probability of default, changes in U.S. interest rates will impact more spreads of countries9
with lower ratings.  Second, countries with higher ratings tend to have a lower level of
debt, so the burden of the debt will increase less in countries with high ratings when U.S.
rates increase.  Third, if there is a flight to quality when the U.S. rates increase, spread
from “riskier” countries (countries with lower ratings) should react more strongly.
The specifications described assume a zero correlation between the error term and
the explanatory variables.  This correlation may arise if the explanatory variables are
endogenously determined.  We do not expect changes in U.S. interest rates or changes in
ratings to respond to contemporaneous daily changes in emerging market spreads or stock
prices.  However, a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term
is possible.  This correlation can arise if the error term is if, for example, the true original
model were in levels.  In that case, the error term in our equations would be in first
differences and correlated with the lagged endogenous variable by construction.  To
correct for potential biased coefficients, we estimate the more complete specification,
equation (5), using instrumental variables.  As instruments, we use lagged values of the
lagged dependent variable, as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982).
B. Event Studies
The above specifications study the contemporaneous effect of ratings on spreads
and stock returns.  However, they do not examine any possible dynamic effects of
upgrades and downgrades.  To have a sense of any dynamic effects that might be taking
place, we use event studies.  Dynamics effects are interesting because market participants
can anticipate changes in ratings.  Therefore, the contemporaneous effect might be
smaller than the total effect of rating changes.  Moreover, credit ratings can act10
procyclically, downgrading countries during bad times and upgrading them during good
times.  We will not be able to disentangle these two observationally equivalent
hypotheses, but we are able to observe whether downturns and rallies take place before
downgrades and upgrades.  Dynamics effects are also interesting because the effect of
upgrades and downgrades can dissipate over time.
The event study looks at country risk and stock market spreads (domestic stock
markets prices relative to the U.S. S&P500 index) in a 10-day window around an upgrade
or downgrade.  All spreads and prices are set to 100 at day –10, in that way we can easily
measure the cumulative effects over time and we can, at the same time, compare spreads
across countries.
To perform the event studies we work with “clean events,” i.e. upgrades and
downgrades that do not overlap in windows of +/- 10 days.  This distinction is important
when considering an event window, to be able to isolate the effect of each change in
rating.  Figure 1 plots the ratings over time for three major rating agencies for a sample of
countries.  The figure suggests that many upgrades and downgrades across rating
agencies occur simultaneously across agencies.  In particular, the East Asian countries are
downgraded during the Asian crisis and upgraded afterwards.  Only few changes take
place before the crisis in the case of Malaysia and South Korea.
5
3. Data
Our data set contains daily series of EMBI spreads, stock returns, interest rates,
and credit ratings.  We work with 16 emerging markets including East Asian, Eastern
                                                            
5 For a detailed study on how ratings are changed, see Cruces (2001).11
European, and Latin American economies.  The countries are in the data set are:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Korea (South), Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.  The data set
covers the period January 1990-June 2000.  Appendix Table 1 displays the available data
for each country and variable.
JP Morgan produces the EMBI and EMBI+ (henceforth EMBI) series for a group
of emerging markets, but also on a country-by-country basis.  The index by country is a
total return index that tracks traded debt instruments denominated in foreign currency.
The instruments used are Brady bonds, benchmark Eurobonds, loans, and Argentine
domestic debt.  The EMBI spreads mostly reflect the difference between each country’s
sovereign bond yields relative to yields of benchmark instruments issued from developed
countries.  The spreads are commonly used as measures of country risk or default risk.
When the probability of a sovereign default increases vis-à-vis the U.S., bond prices
decrease and yield spreads increase.  The other variables that we use in this paper, stock
returns, interest rates, and credit ratings, were downloaded from  Bloomberg.  Stock
market price indexes for each country are measured in U.S. dollars.  We use ratings on
sovereign debt issued in domestic and foreign currency.  These ratings try to measure the
ability of the issuer to pay back its debt.  We work with ratings from three major
international rating agencies: Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch-IBCA.
Table 1 provides some measures of financial market instability in our sample.
Daily changes (in absolute values) in both markets are large and oscillate around 2.5
percent for sovereign spreads and around 1.6 percent for stocks.  Our number of
observations is high (about 11 thousand for bond spreads and 22 thousand for stock12
prices).  Tables 1 and 2 examine the characteristics of the changes in rating in our sample.
Table 2 reports the number of upgrades and downgrades per rating agency and Table 3
reports the number of upgrades and downgrades per country.  This last table shows that
countries with currency collapses during the 1990s, such as Korea, Malaysia, Brazil, and
Indonesia, were frequently re-evaluated by rating agencies.  Appendix Table 2 shows the
scale and type of ratings used by each rating agency.
4. Results
We examine first the impact effect of changes in ratings and then we concentrate
on the dynamics aspects of market responses to rating changes.
A. Panel Regressions
The panel regression results for the country risk are reported in Table 4.  The
columns of the table display the alternative specifications.  The first column shows that
the coefficient for the lag dependent variable is positive and statistically significant.  The
coefficient for the changes in ratings (domestic and foreign) is negative and statistically
significant, although small when compared to the average daily change in spreads.  In
days of rating changes, spreads only change by about 0.5 percent while the average
absolute change of spreads in our sample is about 2 percent.
The second column examines separately whether changes in domestic ratings
have different effects from changes in ratings of foreign countries.  Interestingly, we now
find that changes in ratings of domestic debt not only have a statistically significant
effect, but this effect is also economically important, with rating changes leading to13
changes in the spreads of about 2.5 percent.  Foreign ratings also matter, but their effect
is substantially smaller averaging about 0.4 percent over the sample.  Our sample on
ratings includes ratings on foreign-currency debt and domestic-currency debt.  The first
rating captures sovereign risk while the second also makes an assessment of devaluation
risk.  Since we are examining sovereign yield spreads, ratings on domestic-currency debt
should not affect yield spreads once controlled for ratings directly related to country risk.
Thus, column 3 examines separately the effects of ratings on foreign- and domestic-
currency debt.  As expected, ratings on foreign-currency debt are not statistically
significant.  Moreover, ratings on sovereign debt, once estimated independently from
those of domestic-currency debt, have stronger effects on sovereign risk, as captured by
the yield spreads.  On average, changes in the assessment of rating agencies about
country risk lead to spread changes averaging about 3.2 percent.
The crises of the 1990s and the speed at which a crisis in one country engulfed the
region and even spread around the globe have spawned a still growing literature on
contagion. Much of the research centers on the role of financial links versus trade links.
While opinions about the channels of transmission diverge,
6 almost everybody agrees that
in several cases contagion has been mostly regional.  The Tequila crisis was basically
confined to Latin American countries and the crisis in Thailand spread only to Asian
economies.
7  We now examine whether these regional contagion effects are also present
when we examine contagion effects of credit ratings.  The results are reported in columns
4 and 5.  Interestingly, regional effects seem to be stronger than those from countries
                                                            
6 For example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000a) and Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2000) have pointed
to the role of financial links and have focused on the behavior of international banks and mutual funds.
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2000) in contrast have focused on the role of trade links.14
from other regions, with the within-the-region rating changes leading to an average
increase in yields of 0.8 percent while the across-regions rating changes only triggering
an average change in spreads of about 0.4 percent.  It is the rating agencies’ assessment
of currency risk (ratings on domestic-currency denominated debt) the one that matters for
regional contagion but it is the rating agencies’ assessment of sovereign risk the one that
matters when assessing across regions spillover effects of ratings.
After Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) brought to the limelight the close
relationship between the capital inflows episode to emerging markets during the early
1990s to monetary policy in the United States, the number of papers written on this topic
has increased significantly.  A large number of papers has focused on the relationship
between capital flows or foreign exchange reserves and interest rates in financial centers,
others have focused on the links between returns in emerging markets and returns in
financial centers.  Others, as described in the introduction, have focused on the effects of
interest rate hikes on interest rates and country risk.  Interestingly, while these links were
quite strong in the early 1990s, these links diluted somewhat in the mid-1990s, but
reappeared in the late 1990s.
The changing relationship between financial markets in emerging economies and
in financial centers is particularly clear in the research studying the determinants of
country risk, as examined in the introduction (see, Kamin and von Keist (1999), on one
hand, and Herrera and Perry (2000), on the other).  While examining the determinants of
this time-varying relationship is beyond the scope of this paper, we will now examine
whether hikes in interest rates in financial centers are transmitted more strongly to
                                                                                                                                                                                    
7  Kaminsky and  Reinhart (2000b) analyze why some crises become systemic while some others are
confined to the national borders or at most are of a regional nature.15
vulnerable economies.  We divide the sample into two equal parts according to the
country ratings.  The results indicate that vulnerable economies are more strongly
affected by the vagaries of international financial markets than healthier economies.  The
effect is about 50 percent higher.
Table 5 reports similar estimations for stock market returns.  The results are less
strong than in the case of sovereign debt.  This is not unexpected since assessments on
sovereign risk should affect more closely yields on sovereign debt rather than stock
returns.  Still, stock returns seem to react more strongly to fluctuations in interest rates in
financial centers when the economy tends to be more fragile, as captured by low ratings
from credit agencies.
B. Event Studies
In the panel estimations, we just focus the instantaneous response of bond and
stock markets in emerging economies.  To capture whether credit ratings have a
persistent effect on the mood of investors, we rely on event-study methods commonly
used in the finance literature.  The event-study methodology also allows us to examine
the claim that rating agencies behave procyclically, upgrading countries in good states
and downgrading them in times of crises.  Thus, we examine the behavior of asset
markets around the time of the rating changes (+/- 10 day-windows).  Standard event
study methodology requires linking rating events to abnormal returns.  That is why we
base the event study on the yield spreads between sovereign government debt and the
benchmark instruments from industrial countries.  In the case of stocks, we use the dollar16
“stock spreads” between emerging markets stock prices and the S&P500 U.S. stock
market index.
Figures 2 and 3 summarize the event-study results in some detail for the case of
domestic upgrades and downgrades.  The four plots in each figure show the cumulative
abnormal returns over that window around the time of changes in ratings.  The panels on
the left examine the effects of upgrades while the panels on the right report the effects of
downgrades.  The top panels examine rating changes of both foreign- and domestic-
currency denominated debt, the bottom panels do the same for changes in ratings of just
foreign-currency denominated debt.  Both figures only look at the responses in the days
before and after ratings of the domestic debt.  Day zero is the day of changes in ratings.
With respect to the behavior of markets in the days leading to the rating changes,
the evidence seem to support the hypothesis that rating agencies may have contributed to
amplify the boom-bust pattern in emerging markets.  Overall upgrades occur when
markets are rallying and downgrades when emerging markets are collapsing.  This effect
seems to be stronger in the case of downgrades.  For example, bond spreads increase up
to 9 percent in the 10-days prior to downgrades.  Similarly, the stock market spreads
decline up to 7 percent.  Naturally, these fluctuations could reflect an anticipation effect.
Still, we are most inclined to interpret them as evidence of procyclical behavior of rating
agencies.  In fact, our results are consistent with the findings in Reinhart (2001).  In that
paper, the author examines whether rating agencies actions anticipated the crises of the
1990s.  With a large sample of countries and crises, the author concludes that rating
changes far from being leading indicators of crises have turned out to be lagging
indicators of financial collapses.17
With respect to the aftermath of the rating changes, the results are more
ambiguous.  We first examine the responses of bond yields.  The results suggest an
asymmetric response of bond spreads after upgrades and downgrades.  In particular,
according to this event study analysis, the effects of downgrades tend to be somewhat
more sustained while the effects of upgrades are usually reversed within two days.
Typically, after experiencing an upgrade, bond spreads decline about 2 percent but within
ten days bond spreads increase by about 4 percent, relative to the value at day -10.  A
different picture emerges from the analysis of downturns.  While the contemporaneous
reaction is similar to that of an upgrade (the spread changes by about 2 percent),
following downgrades, the bond market does not recover.  On the contrary, spreads
continue to increase by at least 2 percent.  The effects are somewhat stronger when we
examine downgrades of foreign-currency denominated bonds only.  Spreads widened an
extra 5 percent.  In contrast, the effects of upgrades seem to be long lasting in the stock
market, with domestic stock markets gaining an extra 2 percent return relative to that of
the stock index in the United States.  This is not the case for downgrades.
Figure 4 displays event studies for foreign events.  Instead of using as an event
upgrades and downgrades on sovereign ratings from the domestic country, the figure
displays the behavior of EMBI spreads and stock spreads around upgrades and
downgrades of spreads from other emerging markets.  The figures on the left display
upgrades, while the figures on the right show downgrades.  The top panel uses EMBI
spreads, while the bottom one uses stock spreads.  The results show that foreign-currency
upgrades are followed by large decreased in EMBI spreads and large increases in stock18
market prices.  Foreign downgrades are followed by increases in EMBI spreads although
the results are not statistically very important.
5. Conclusions
This paper complements previous research on the effects of credit ratings on
financial markets in emerging economies.  Most of the previous research has focused on
quantifying the effects of changes in ratings of a country on sovereign risk as measured
by the yield spread of domestic instruments relative to developed country benchmark
instruments.  In this paper, not only did we expand this exercise with updated data, but
also we tested new hypotheses to have a more complete characterization on the effects of
sovereign rating changes.  We found that rating changes have effects both on the
instruments being rated and on other instruments within the same country.  We found that
sovereign ratings have a significant impact on stock returns.  We also examined whether
ratings of other countries’ sovereign debt have the potential to trigger contagion in
financial markets.  We found that rating changes have spillover effects to other countries.
The effects tend to be limited to the neighbor countries.
This paper also complements the previous literature on financial market linkages.
This literature has examined the effects of changes in interest rates in financial centers.
The results in this literature have been mixed, with for example sovereign risk being
affected positively by interest rate hikes in some episodes but not in others.  One
important restriction in all these studies is that country risk obeys a common linear
specification.  One possibility is that interest rate hikes may have more damaging effects
in countries near insolvency or with very fragile economies.  We investigated this19
possibility and examined whether countries with lower ratings are affected more severely
by changes in U.S. interest rates.  We found that countries with more vulnerable
economies are affected 50 percent more by fluctuations of interest rates in the rest of the
world.  While our results help to understand better the movements of financial markets in
emerging economies, we are far from explaining daily volatility.  While this is a hard task
not only for developing countries by also for mature markets,
8 there is still room for
improvement.
With respect to understanding better the effects of ratings, there are several
potential extensions to this paper.  We have not examined yet whether changes in ratings
have more impact during crisis times than during tranquil times.  Other extensions can be
addressed with new data.  For example, if ratings are informative, it will be instructive to
analyze whether sovereign ratings are more informative for less transparent countries
than for more transparent countries.  Further extensions imply using other ratings, beyond
sovereign debt ratings.  It would be interesting to work with corporate ratings to
investigate whether ratings convey different information for different groups of firms.
For example, one can expect that firms issuing ADRs, with more transparent accounting
standards and for which more information is available, to be less affected by ratings than
firms trading in less transparent local markets. Also, since rating agencies also assess
exchange rate risk, we could examine whether these ratings are informative by looking at
whether they affect differently countries and companies with different with exchange rate
exposure.  Also, it would be interesting to examine whether firms producing traded-goods
                                                            
8  R
2in all studies explaining daily variations in stock prices or bond yields is very low.20
are less affected by country-risk, that is whether collateral (valued in international
markets) can act as a buffer to country-risk changes.21
References
Anderson, T., and Hsiao, C., 1982, “Formulation and Estimation of Dynamic Models
Using Panel Data,” Journal of Econometrics, 18:47-82.
Calvo, G., Leiderman, L., and Reinhart, C., 1993, “Capital Inflows and Real Exchange
Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors,” Staff Papers
International Monetary Fund, 40:108-51.
Calvo, G. and Mendoza, E., 2000, “Rational Contagion and the Globalization of
Securities Markets,” Journal of International Economics, June.
Cantor, R. and Packer, F., 1996, “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 2:2, 37-53.
Corsetti, G.,  Pesenti, P., and N.  Roubini, N., 2000, “Competitive  Devaluations: A
Welfare-Based Approach” Journal of International Economics, June.
Cruces, J., 2001, “Statistical Properties of Sovereign Credit Ratings,” mimeo,
Washington University and Universidad de San Andres, Argentina.
Dooley, M., 1998, “A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets,” NBER Working Paper No.
W6300.
Eichengreen, Barry, and  Mody, Ashoka, 1998, “What Explains Changing Spreads on
Emerging-Market Debt: Fundamentals or Market Sentiment?” NBER working paper
no. W6408.
Frankel, J., Schmukler, S., and Serven, L., 2000, “Global Transmission of Interest Rates:
Monetary Independence and the Currency Regime” World Bank working paper No.
2424.
Ferri, G., Liu, G., and Stiglitz, J., 1999, “The  Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies:
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis,” Economic Notes 3:335-355.
Hand, J., Holthausen, R., and Leftwich, R., 1992, “The Effect of Bond Rating Agency
Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices,” The Journal of Finance, 157:2, 733-752.
Herrera, Santiago and Perry, Guillermo, 2000, “Determinants of Latin Spreads in the
New Economy Era: The Role of U.S. Interest Rates and Other External Variables,”
mimeo, World Bank.
Holthausen, R., and Leftwich, R., 1986, “The Effect of Bond Rating Changes on Stock
Prices,” Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 57-89.22
Kamin, Steven and  von  Kleist,  Karsten, 1999, “The Evolution and Determinants of
Emerging Market Credit Spreads in the 1990s,” International Finance Discussion
Paper 1999-653, Federal Reserve Board.
Kaminsky, G., Lyons, R., and Schmukler, S., 2000, “Managers, Investors, and Crisis:
Mutual Fund Strategies in Emerging Markets” NBER Working paper No. 7855.
Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C., 2000a, “On Crises, Contagion, and Confusion,” Journal
of International Economics, June.
Kaminsky, G. and Reinhart, C., 2000b, “The Center and the Periphery: Tales of Financial
Turmoils,” February 2000.
Kaminsky, G. and  Schmukler, S., 1999, “What Triggers Market Jitters?”  Journal of
International Money and Finance, June, 18:537-560.
Krugman, P., 1998, “Saving Asia: It is Time to Get Radical,” Fortune, September 7, pp.
74-80.
Larrain, G.,  Reisen, H. and Von  Maltzan, J., 1997, “Emerging Market Risk and
Sovereign Credit Rating,” OECD Development Centre, Technical Papers, No. 124.
McKinnon, R. and H. Pill, 1997, “Credible Economic  Liberalizations and
Overborrowing,” American Economic Review, 87, 2, 189-93.
Reisen, H. and Von Maltzan, J., 1999, “Boom and Bust and Sovereign Ratings,” OECD
Development Centre, Technical Paper No. 148.
Reinhart, C., 2001, “Do Sovereign Credit Ratings Anticipate Financial Crises? Evidence
from Emerging Markets,” mimeo, University of Maryland.
Richards, A. and Deddouche, D., 1999, “Bank Rating Changes and Bank Stock Returns:
Puzzling Evidence from Emerging Markets,” IMF Working Paper.
Stiglitz, Joseph, 2000, “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Agency changes Upgrades Downgrades
Moody's 48 19 29
    Foreign currency debt 37 14 23
    Local currency debt 11 5 6
S&P's 75 28 47
    Foreign currency debt 45 19 26
    Local currency debt 30 9 21
Fitch 47 21 26
    Foreign currency debt 30 15 15
    Local currency debt 17 6 11
Total 170 68 102
Total Upgrades and Downgrades by Rating Agency
The table displays the total changes in ratings for long-term sovereign
debt in foreign and local currency. The sample used is the one
available for stock returns.
Table 2Agency Total changes Upgrades Downgrades
Argentina 5 3 2
Brazil 10 7 3
Chile 4 3 1
Colombia 5 0 5
Indonesia 13 1 12
Korea (South) 18 9 9
Malaysia 11 3 8
Mexico 9 5 4
Peru 110
Phillipines 4 4 0
Poland 660
Russia 18 7 11
Taiwan 000
Thailand 10 2 8
Turkey 413
Venezuela 5 2 3
Total 123 54 69
Table 3
Total Rating Changes by Country
The table displays the total changes in ratings for long-term sovereign

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Brazil 5 4 1
Chile 3 2 1
Colombia 5 0 5
Mexico 3 1 2
Peru 11 0
Venezuela 3 1 2





Philippines 4 4 0
Taiwan 00 0
Thailand 71 6
Total 31 16 15
Eastern Europe
Poland 5 5 0
Russia 12 7 5
Turkey 21 1
Total 19 13 6
Gran Total 73 39 34
Table 6
Events are for 10-day windows, including foreign-currency and
domestic-currency debt. The events are for domestic country events.
The sample used is the one available for stock returns.
Number Clean Events by CountryThe figures report the sovereign ratings from three credit rating agencies for a selected group of countries. Sovereign letters are
published in letters (AAA, Aaaa3SS,....). The scale is different for each agency. Appendix Table 2 gives a mapping between each
rating letters and a numerical scale. 
Figure 1



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fitch-IBCANumber of clean events: 28 Number of clean events: 17
Number of clean events: 22 Number of clean events: 14
The figures display the log of EMBI spreads (normalized to 100 at day -10), +/- one standard deviation. The events are only related
to upgrades and downgrades in the domestic country.
Figure 2
Event Studies of EMBI Spreads
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-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Days relative to announcementNumber of clean events: 39 Number of clean events: 34
Number of clean events: 35 Number of clean events: 23
Figure 3
Event Studies of Stock Market Indexes
The figures display the log of local stock market index relative to the U.S. S&P 500 (normalized to 100 at day -10), +/- one standard
deviation. The events are only related to upgrades and downgrades in the domestic country.
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-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Days relative to announcementNumber of clean events: 99 Number of clean events: 63
Number of clean events: 84 Number of clean events: 116
Figure 4
Event Studies -- Foreign-Country Events
The top panel displays EMBI spreads, while the bottom panel diplays stock spreads , i.e. the log of local stock market index relative
to the U.S. S&P 500 (normalized to 100 at day -10). Both panels also plot +/- one standard deviation. The events are only related to
upgrades and downgrades in foreign countries, both on foreign-currency and domestic-currency debt.
EMBI Spreads
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s         Moody's               S&P      FITCH- IBCA
Rating Number Rating Number Rating Number Rating Number
Aaa3SS 8.5 Ba2 5.1 AAA 8 AAA 8
Aaa3S 8.8 Ba1SS 5.3 AA+ 7.33 AA+ 7.33
Aaa3 8.7 Ba1S 5.5 AA 7 AA 7
Aaa2SS 8.9 Ba1 5.4 AA- 6.66 AA- 6.66
Aaa2S 9.2 Ba 5 A+ 6.33 A+ 6.33
Aaa2 9.1 B3SS 3.5 A 6 A 6
Aaa1SS 9.3 B3S 3.8 A- 5.66 A- 5.66
Aaa1S 9.5 B3 3.7 BBB+ 5.33 BBB+ 5.33
Aaa1 9.4 B2SS 3.9 BBB 5 BBB 5
Aaa 9 B2S 4.2 BBB- 4.66 BBB- 4.66
Aa3SS 7.5 B2 4.1 BB+ 4.33 BB+ 4.33
Aa3S 7.8 B1SS 4.3 BB 4 BB 4
Aa3 7.7 B1S 4.5 BB- 3.66 BB- 3.66
Aa2SS 7.9 B1 4.4 B+ 3.33 B+ 3.33
Aa2S 8.2 B 4 B 3 B 3
Aa2 8.1 Caa3SS 2.5 B- 2.66 B- 2.66
Aa1SS 8.3 Caa3S 2.8 CCC 2 CCC+ 2.33
Aa1S 8.5 Caa3 2.7 CC 1 CCC 2
Aa1 8.4 Caa2SS 2.9 CCC- 1.66
Aa 8 Caa2S 3.2 CC 1.33
A3SS 6.5 Caa2 3.1 C 1
A3S 6.8 Caa1SS 3.3
A3 6.7 Caa1S 3.5
A2SS 6.9 Caa1 3.4
A2S 7.2 Caa 3
A2 7.1 Ca3SS 1.5
A1SS 7.3 Ca3S 1.8
A1S 7.5 Ca3 1.7
A1 7.4 Ca2SS 1.9
A 7 Ca2S 2.2
Baa3SS 5.5 Ca2 2.1
Baa3S 5.8 Ca1SS 2.3
Baa3 5.7 Ca1S 2.5
Baa2SS 5.9 Ca1 2.4
Baa2S 6.2 Ca 2
Baa2 6.1 C3SS 0.5
Baa1SS 6.3 C3S 0.8
Baa1S 6.5 C3 0.7
Baa1 6.4 C2SS 0.9
Baa 6 C2S 1.2
Ba3SS 4.5 C2 1.1
Ba3S 4.8 C1SS 1.3
Ba3 4.7 C1S 1.5
Ba2SS 4.9 C1 1.4
Ba2S 5.2 C 1
Source: Bloomberg
Appendix Table 2
Scale of Ratings for Sovereign Debt